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Abstract
The following article examines the relevance of gender and intersectional analy-
ses to better understanding hybrid threats, in particular those that are increasingly 
targeting civilian environments. The authors first present relevant concepts includ-
ing hybrid threats and warfare, resilience, disinformation, civilian agency, and in-
tersectionality as a method. Thereafter they discuss how disinformation is used to 
destabilise societies by directly attacking civilian spaces and attempting to foment 
polarisation and unrest, if not conflict. The authors then discuss how the concepts 
of disinformation and civilian agency are illuminated through gender and intersec-
tional analyses, speaking to complex, civilian contexts by examining how gender 
(and race) have been employed to attempt to foment destabilisation. They conclude 
with some brief reflections about the role of gender and intersectional approaches 
in understanding hybrid threats and warfare, not just in Europe but also for other 
parts of the world. 
Key Words: Hybrid threats; Disinformation; Gender; Intersectionality; Destabilisa-
tion; Identity
Resumen 
El artículo examina la relevancia de los análisis interseccionales y de género 
para comprender mejor las amenazas híbridas, en particular aquellas que se dirigen 
cada vez más a entornos civiles. En primer lugar se presentan los conceptos más 
relevantes, que incluyen: amenazas híbridas y guerra, resiliencia, desinformación, 
agencia civil e interseccionalidad como método. A partir de estos, se discute cómo se 
utiliza la desinformación para desestabilizar sociedades atacando directamente los 
espacios civiles e intentando fomentar la polarización, el malestar o directamente el 
conflicto. A continuación, se discute cómo los conceptos de desinformación y agencia 
civil se pueden comprender a través de análisis interseccionales y de género, cuando 
se abordan contextos civiles complejos al examinar cómo se ha empleado el género 
(y la raza) para intentar fomentar la desestabilización. Las conclusiones proponen 
algunas breves reflexiones sobre el papel del género y los enfoques interseccionales 
en la comprensión de las amenazas híbridas y la guerra, no solo en Europa sino 
también en otras partes del mundo.
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Resumo
O artigo examina a relevância das análises intersetoriais e de gênero para enten-
der melhor as ameaças híbridas, particularmente aquelas que têm como alvo cada 
vez mais ambientes civis. Em primeiro lugar, são apresentados os conceitos mais 
relevantes, que incluem: ameaças híbridas e guerra, resiliência, desinformação, 
agência civil e interseccionalidade como método. Com base nisso, discute-se como a 
desinformação é usada para desestabilizar as sociedades, atacando diretamente os 
espaços civis e tentando promover a polarização, a agitação ou o conflito direto. A 
seguir, é discutido como os conceitos de desinformação e agência civil podem ser en-
tendidos por meio de análises intersetoriais e de gênero, ao abordar contextos civis 
complexos, examinando como gênero (e raça) tem sido usado para tentar promover 
a desestabilização. Os resultados propõem algumas reflexões breves sobre o papel do 
gênero e das abordagens intersetoriais na compreensão das ameaças híbridas e da 
guerra, não apenas na Europa, mas também em outras partes do mundo.
Palavras chave: Ameaças híbridas; Desinformação; Gênero; Interseccionalidade; De-
sestabilização; Identidade
1. Introduction
Current analyses of hybrid threats pay very little attention to gender or the in-
tersection of different identity markers as an element of analysis (a recent excep-
tion being Herrero-Diz et.al 2020). This is typical of more traditional approaches 
to threats and warfare that are generally state-centric and show less awareness 
of the role of the civilian domain to the dynamics of conflict. Understanding 
hybrid threats and warfare, however, reveals the complex spectrum of conflict 
that recognises multiple approaches (beyond military) to create destabilisation, 
insecurity, and eventually violent conflict. More recent research on hybrid threats 
explores the roles of civilians in the hybrid threat and conflict spectrum, and in 
particular how non-military tools are employed to disrupt and destabilise the ci-
vilian environment, having broader implications on local, regional and national 
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security (Hoogensen Gjørv 2020). To better understand how civilians are actors as 
well as targets in hybrid warfare scenarios, it is crucial to understand the civilian 
domain itself, and where its potential vulnerabilities lie. These vulnerabilities are 
often connected to identity markers that intersect in various social contexts, from 
gender and class to race, ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation. These markers are 
integrally linked to societal social norms roles, and beliefs that are crucial to what 
civilians consider fundamental to the survival of their physical or social selves. In 
other words, to their and societal and national survival and security. 
We argue that including an intersectional analysis is thus relevant to iden-
tifying vulnerabilities in society, but is also instrumental to understanding the 
possibilities for societal resilience – the ability of society to resist or respond to 
hybrid threats. As such, gender and other intersecting identity markers are im-
portant both in understanding the risks posed by hybrid threats, their potentially 
different impacts on men and women (often combined with other identity markers 
such as race/ethnicity or sexual orientation, for example), and the ways in which 
resilience can be strengthened. This paper will review how we understand hybrid 
threats and the role civilians play in the transmission of such threats, and then 
propose an overview of the ways in which gender and intersectional analysis can 
be better used in relation to analysis of hybrid threats, using examples from recent 
incidents in Europe, to strengthen understanding and provide more comprehensive 
recommendations for building resilience.
Before going on to analyse the ways in which gender is important in hybrid 
threats and resilience, it is important to define exactly what we understand by 
hybrid threats and resilience. The term hybrid threat or hybrid warfare has been 
criticised for lack of analytical clarity, and it is clear that it can encompass a wide 
variety of different elements. 
2. Method
In this paper we apply a concepts-oriented approach to case examples to demon-
strate how gender and intersectionality are relevant and important in our under-
standing of how hybrid threats operate in the civilian domain. As such we first 
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elucidate what we mean by gender and intersectionality, lenses through which we 
argue we can better understand the strengths and vulnerabilities of the civilian 
domain in the context of hybrid threats and warfare. We then present the core con-
cepts we will work with, both defining these concepts but initially flagging gender 
and intersectionality as we do so. We focus upon the concepts of hybrid threats, 
resilience, disinformation, civilian agency and, and thereafter engage these con-
cepts in the Development section with regard to the destabilisation of societies, 
and the potential of resilience informed by gender perspectives.
2.1. Gender, intersectionality, and the complexity of the civilian 
environment
Discussions about how we understand gender continue to evolve. In the 1980s 
and 1990s it was increasingly clear that a lot of the work addressing gender ine-
qualities – generally pertaining to inequalities between men and women - never-
theless excluded certain, marginalized, segments of the female population, namely 
women of colour and/or of non-European ethnicities. It became increasingly rec-
ognised that it was not enough to speak about “women” in general, because even 
between women many different inequalities existed on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation, class, and other identity markers. Thus the term “Intersec-
tionality” was introduced to take into account the complexity of inequalities and 
power relations between not just binary and simplistic, categories of “men” and 
“women”, but between different classes of white women (affluent or middle class, 
or working class or poor), or between white and black or brown women, women 
of European heritage (often characterised as “white” and “christian”) and women 
of colour and/or outside of the Christian tradition (including indigenous women), 
which could be even further complicated by class, sexual orientation, or other 
marginalized identities. 
Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in the late 1980s (Crenshaw 1991), the term 
intersectionality was designed to critically assess the intersection between race, 
gender, class and other identity categories that have been regularly produced and 
reproduced within different contexts. Intersectional analysis makes visible how 
identity has been produced and used to expand, reinforce, or reduce power. As not-
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ed by Mohanty, “focusing on the identities and perspectives of the marginalized 
can produce a deeper knowledge of objective social structures and their effects… 
[Theories] elaborated through such concepts as “intersectionality” and “epistemic 
privilege” – are based on a non-positivist conception of objective social knowl-
edge” (Mohanty, 2018: 418).  In an interview Crenshaw noted (Coaston 2019) that 
this approach has been subjected to a backlash, being accused of creating “identi-
ty politics,” and is itself responsible for fragmenting societies along identity lines, 
in turn creating mistrust and distrust between people.  Such accusations reflect 
what we will continue to examine below: systems of trust have often relied upon, 
and studied through, the normalisation of an assumed “identity-free” universal 
man (Yuval-Davis, 2011). When challenged however, the universal man is exposed 
as reflecting the identities of those with power in a given society (eg: affluent, 
white, male, able, heterosexual) (Carasthatis, 2014). Those not reflecting these 
normalised identities become threats to that system of trust. Indeed, for that 
system to survive, distrust of the other (identity) is imperative (Bilgic, Hoogensen 
Gjørv & Wilcock 2019). As agents of security, states can try to build or maintain 
institutional trust through particularised distrust-building towards the racialised, 
gendered, classed “other”.
The dynamics behind hybrid threats (discussed below) demonstrate the com-
plexities of the various ways gender and other identity markers can be defined 
and manipulated to serve specific purposes. Gender is a relational concept whose 
construction varies across geographical space and time. The impacts of gender con-
structions are to be understood in relation to other socially constructed categori-
zations and hierarchies of power such as race and class. The conceptualization and 
definition of gender are highly fluid and dynamic depending on the intervening 
events and actors taking part in the construction process. Gender categorisations 
can be manipulated and refashioned in discourses, instrumentalized in politics, 
or reconstructed by individuals and communities to target social vulnerabilities. 
Hybrid threats such as the examples that follow in this article show the extent to 
which gender is complex and intersects with other identities. In situations involv-
ing threats that focus on the identities of (usually) marginalized or non-dominant 
identities (Hoogensen and Stuvøy 2006), the identity of the other is constructed 
by the self as abnormal, not fitting into the dominant group, different, not trust-
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worthy, a threat and thus he/she/ they must be punished, sent to jail or back to 
his/her/ their homeland(s) etc. These constructions of the other as a threat are 
based on the manipulation of social norms that there are “normal” or “traditional” 
gender norms and behaviours which these “others” threaten. A typical example 
(also illuminated by Crenshaw above) is the backlash against a perceived under-
mining of “natural” masculine dominance by feminists who call for gender equali-
ty. Societal vulnerabilities and particularly those associated with polarizations and 
misunderstanding on gender issues can be exploited through hostile campaigns 
employing digital communication. For example, online, with micro-targeting and 
social engineering, it is very easy for malevolent actors to target a massive num-
ber of civilians on social media and in video games using Augmented Reality (AR) 
and Virtual Reality (VR) diffusing messages making use of fabricated/ imagined/ 
constructed “identities” that are further labeled as a threat and engaging in vile, 
malevolent, and criminal acts. Such malevolent actors use specific tropes or stere-
otypes exploiting identities/differences/ inequalities that are present as existing 
social cleavages. If the disinformation begins with a focus on gendered discours-
es, the public can easily shape, refashion, and extend the disinformation so that 
other identities are targeted, enacting civilian agency.. Communities that are sym-
pathetic to the messaging of the original disinformation often rely on the particu-
larized trust (Bilgic, Hoogensen Gjørv & Wilcock 2019) that reverberates and grows 
within social echo chambers (often on social media), thus strengthening their own 
perceptions of their selves (the pure, the natives, the high people, the victims of 
threats, the innocent white young women etc.) and sustaining divisions, othering, 
discrimination, exercise of one’s power and dominance over the other.             
Using this framework helps us to understand the ways in which political cleav-
ages or vulnerabilities operate, and further how they are targeted through hybrid 
attacks. 
2.2. Hybrid threats and warfare
There continues to be debate around the definitions about hybrid warfare, hy-
brid threats, and a related concept “gray zone” conflicts. There is additionally 
an overlap or conflation with other concepts such as remote warfare, asymmetric 
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warfare, new wars, sixth-generation/ contactless/ next-generation/ ambiguous/ 
asymmetrical/nonlinear warfare, full-spectrum conflict, among others (Watts & 
Biegon,2019; Giannopoulos et.al 2020). 
Earlier conceptions of hybrid warfare maintained a kinetic or lethal component 
defining it as: “Threats that incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare 
including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts 
including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder, conducted 
by both sides and a variety of non-state actors” (Hoffman 2007: 8). As noted by 
James Wither (2016), this type of “hybrid” warfare was distinct from historical 
forms of warfare due to the mixing of methods – that is, conventional and irreg-
ular. However, the increased use of information warfare and targeting of public 
opinion became another distinguishing feature by 2014, as articulated by then 
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in his characterization of Russian 
tactics in Ukraine, focusing in part on what he called the Russian “aggressive pro-
gram of disinformation” (Wither 2016: 76). In time, non-military methods of hy-
brid warfare, especially disinformation campaigns and other approaches to desta-
bilize societies (such as cyber-attacks on infrastructure) have become key features 
of hybrid warfare and threats. 
At the same time, the notion of “grey zone” conflicts have been increasingly 
used, referring to the blurring of the previously perceived lines between peace and 
war, where the latter manifested itself through the clear use of overt violence, 
often by state actors/militaries. The grey zone speaks to those measures that cre-
ate destabilization and conflict below those thresholds we traditionally associate 
with war, the overt use of violence. Frank Hoffman distinguishes between hybrid 
warfare and grey zone conflicts whereby the latter is defined as “[t]hose covert 
or illegal activities of non-traditional statecraft that are below the threshold of 
armed organized violence…as a part of an integrated design to achieve strategic 
advantage” (Hoffman 2018: 36), which include disruptive tactics such as influence 
operations, disinformation, psychological operations, destabilizing legal processes, 
etc. This is contrasted with hybrid warfare which pertains more so to the “fused 
mix” of conventional weapons, terrorism, crime, and other forms of violence to 
“obtain desired political objectives” (ibid: 38). In other words, hybrid warfare is 
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not necessarily under threshold, and includes the use of violence. Hoffman notes 
that NATO employs a definition that is broader in scope, “depicting [hybrid war-
fare] as a mixture of military means with non-military tools including propaganda 
and cyber activity” (ibid: 39), which is closer to Hoffman’s definition of grey zone 
conflict. 
A considerable amount of research on hybrid threats and warfare focuses on 
state actors as perpetrators, as well as primary targets – addressing Russian tac-
tics in the Baltic states, especially Ukraine (Fox & Rossow, 2017; Haynie, 2020; 
Veebel, 2020), the role of China (Raska, 2015, Burgers & Romaniuk, 2016), or the 
roles of NATO (Brânda & Sauliuc, 2020), the EU (Zaliznyak; 2016; Bajarūnas, 2020), 
and the US (Batyuk, 2017). Recent definitions of hybrid threats and warfare note 
that these strategies are dominantly employed by authoritarian states against 
democratic states (Giannopoulos et al 2020), even though the US has been ac-
cused of conducting hybrid activities against Russia and Iran, for example (Carden 
2017; Ghaffari 2019). Non-state actors also present as aggressors, including groups 
classified as terrorists (Mumford, 2016) especially ISIS (Beccaro, 2018). Both the 
statecentric as well as terrorist-oriented focus explains what can be perceived as 
the significant amount of scholarship on hybrid threats/ warfare using mostly 
realist frameworks (Filipec, 2019; Muradov, 2019) They use the state as a security 
referent thereby downplaying or ignoring the roles other actors such as civilians, 
and the role ordinary people play in the ways conflict develops. The result has 
been that less consideration has been put on the importance of civilians (with the 
exceptions of a few scholars such as Bartowski, 2015; Ratiu & Munteanu, 2018; 
Hoogensen Gjørv 2017; Hoogensen Gjørv & Bilgic, forthcoming) along with the 
implications of gender and other intersectional identity markers in the resulting 
security dynamics.
In an EU Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) Technical Report, the Euro-
pean Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) highlights 
the use of the term “hybrid threat” as an umbrella concept, and notes that in 
particular it “raises the issue of systemic vulnerabilities of democratic systems as 
particular targets” (Giannopoulos et al 2020: 1). The report therefore focuses on 
hostile actors that target vulnerabilities in democratic states, using tactics asso-
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ciated with authoritarian or rogue states and non-state networks. They use then 
“multiple synchronized tools (in principle non-military)”, create ambiguity (hid-
ing intent and attribution), and often include a distraction element (ibid: 2). To 
understand hybrid threats one needs to understand the actors, tools, the domains 
that are targeted and the phases of attack (ibid: 3). Hybrid warfare falls within 
this spectrum of activity as the “hard end” of hybrid threat activity (ibid: 33). This 
approach resembles therefore a mix of the hybrid warfare and gray zone conflict 
approaches outlined above, though hybrid threats are the rough equivalent of grey 
zone conflict (and under threshold, or before the exercise of overt violence), and 
hybrid warfare is distinctly separate resembling Hoffman’s definition of hybrid 
warfare and the employment of violence and/or traditional military measures. Ju-
lian Lindley-French, who has written extensively on NATO, draws on the concept 
of “maskirovka” (military deception) employed by Soviet forces in WWII. Lind-
ley-French defines maskirovka as “war that is short of war, a purposeful strategy 
of deception that combines use of force with disinformation and destabilization 
to create ambiguity in the minds of Alliance leaders about how best to respond” 
(Lindley-French 2015: 4 in Wither 2016: 82). For the purposes of our article we 
focus in particular upon the under threshold (grey zone) activities as these are 
in particular relevant to the targeting, manipulation, and cooperation within the 
civilian domain. It can be argued that better preparation to meet hybrid threats/
grey zone conflicts will mitigate the necessity to employ violent means in an es-
calated hybrid warfare scenario.
Though there is no clear agreement on a definition (Reichborn-Kjennerud/Cul-
len 2016), we can characterize features as such: 1.Employs a combination of multi-
ple means including military, political, economic, legal, cultural, social, infrastruc-
ture, cyber and information domains; 2. A hostile actor aims to avoid detection 
and tries to diffuse/confuse the situational awareness; 3. A hostile actor can be 
state, nonstate or proxy actors (or all of them); 4. It tries to create a situation 
where existing societal differences and grievances are exacerbated. This is espe-
cially done in the civilian domain by non-military means, both cyber-attacks (on 
infrastructure, for example) or by disinformation campaigns.
 DOI: ri14.v19i1.1618 | ISSN: 1697-8293 |  January - June 2021 Volume 19 Nº 1 | ICONO14 
Identity, stability, Hybrid Threats and Disinformation | 48
MONOGRAPH
2.3. Resilience
The impact and breadth of hybrid threats provides a lot of insight into how 
people, communities and nations handle a crisis or conflict. It tests the resilience 
of a society, and illustrates the degree to which societies can be destabilized by 
a non-military threat. Article 3 of the NATO Treaty addresses resilience, with the 
expectation that each member state resists armed attack on the basis of “their 
individual and collective capacity.” Resilience is understood as “a society’s ability 
to resist and recover easily and quickly from such shocks and combines both civil 
preparedness and military capacity” (NATO 2020).
Much of a society’s resilience lies in its population and people’s abilities to 
respond to a crisis, and perhaps more importantly, people’s abilities to adapt to 
abrupt and potentially long-lasting change. 
Resilience reflects an ability to “bounce back” and tackle a crisis and/or threat, 
but also an ability to evolve or adapt. Assumptions about resilience are evident 
in narratives about “returning back to normal” after the coronavirus crisis. Such 
assumptions do not take into account how changes themselves may become nor-
malized over time, and how attitudes and behaviours – not least amongst citizens 
- change as a result. People expect governments to solve a crisis as soon as possi-
ble. But what if, like in the coronavirus crisis, that is not possible? Resilience in 
society may demand adjustments to “new” normal, including new perceptions of 
insecurity. 
2.4. Disinformation
Disinformation has attracted significant interest from various disciplines, (me-
dia and communication, political science, psychology, science and technology 
studies, etc.). Some scholars work on the motives and intents behind the mech-
anisms or tools used to spread the information. Little is still known, however, 
about the role of the targets of disinformation – civilians – and their reactions to 
disinformation, and the subsequent effects of these on security dynamics in vari-
ous contexts.  Disinformation is a contested concept (Derakhshan & Wardle 2017: 
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27), very often conflated with misinformation, which is wrong information, but 
not combined with a political motive to mislead and exacerbate social vulnerabili-
ties. “Fake news”, fabricated/manipulated content, rumors, information pollution, 
“malinformation”, information disorder, junk news, propaganda and others are 
usually conflated with disinformation (Shu et al 2020). Fake news is “information 
deliberately fabricated and published with the intention to deceive and mislead 
others into believing falsehoods or doubting verifiable facts,”1 and is linked to dis-
information, misinformation, and malinformation (Shu et al 2020). Fake news “is 
misleading, in much the same way that disinformation is misleading: it is ‘likely to 
create false beliefs’” (Gelfert 2018: 104). Disinformation is defined as “information 
that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organisation 
or country.”2 It targets and exploits socio-cultural cleavages with the intention of 
“creating social tension, polarising society, instilling fear in the population or un-
dermining their trust in government” (Giannopoulos et al 2020: 43). In elections, 
fake news and other disinformation strategies are employed to cause confusion 
and harm including using myths, rumours, superstition (Shu et al 2020). Very 
often, civilians are not aware the information they share is “fake news” and fab-
ricated with the intention to harm (to foment doubt and mistrust). Importantly, 
the spreading of misinformation or disinformation does not happen in a vacuum. 
Attempts to influence a society start with targeting existing vulnerabilities, and 
indeed, some sources of mis- and disinformation may not even try to disguise or 
hide themselves, as certain citizens may already be inclined to trust such sources 
and spread them willingly to promote a political agenda they support. As such, 
mis- and disinformation attacks may only require small scale or lightweight influ-
ence operations through selected media sites, which may be well-known and even 
popular. We need to be cognizant that mis- and disinformation can, as a result, be 
hidden in plain sight. 
The rapid technological evolution accompanying advances in disinformation 
makes it important to better understand it. The literature has thus far examined 
the roles of various technologies in disinformation including bots, (software appli-
cation running automated tasks (scripts)), botnets (Internet-connected devices, 
each running one or more bots) and AI, and the platforms they target such as social 
media like Twitter, WhatsApp, and Facebook. AI enhances the capability of other 
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technologies, (e.g. social media), and is generally understood as a technology, or 
an artificial system, imitating humans or reproducing human cognition using a 
large training dataset. There are many types of AI techniques (and applications): 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN, e.g.: voice recognition), Generative Adversarial 
Learning (GAN, e.g.: generating photographs of human faces), Natural Language 
Processing (NLP, e.g.: predictive texts). In information operations targeting elec-
tions, some AI techniques are associated with threats: for example, the use of ma-
chine learning to conduct user profiling and micro-targeting exploiting big data, 
or the manipulation of audio and visual materials using GAN for “deepfakes”. A 
significant gap in knowledge therefore is understanding how those technologies 
interact, influence each other and are used simultaneously, (and combined with 
offline practices, e.g. word-of-mouth) in disinformation, and the extent to which 
the information communicated with AI play and important role in disinformation 
affecting civilians, (e.g.: memes, images, voice and video deepfakes).  
2.5. Civilian agency 
Citizen actors engage in diverse strategies to ensure human security (physical 
and economic security primarily), ranging from cooperation with armed groups 
(state or non-state), selective sharing of information and resources, the spread 
of dis/misinformation, to everyday forms of resistance (Hoogensen Gjørv & Stu-
vøy 2006). Civilian agency is often framed as “resilience” but can include resist-
ance (to other citizens, governments, institutions), and includes multiple subjects 
of resilience that can be contradictory (Cavelty, Kaufmann et al. 2015). Civilian 
agency includes all activities approaching (but not including) the use of violence 
if conflict drivers amongst citizens are excessively aggravated (Heffington 2017). 
What then does citizen agency look like in different contexts? How has it affected 
the progression or regression of conflicts? Finally, how can understanding citizen 
agency better help move states and non-state actors out of conflict?
Citizen actions range from efforts to avoid physical violence, remain neutral, or 
be cooperative or collaborative (Baines and Paddon 2012). These actions are often 
influenced by trust levels between civilian and authorities, as well as impact trust 
levels within their communities/societies. The concept of civilian agency politi-
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cises civilian roles by acknowledging potential power at the individual level, and 
using it towards either stability or instability.  Very little is known about the im-
portance of ordinary people in those dynamics especially in the contexts of hybrid 
threats. Civilian agency is integral to the assumptions hostile actors have about 
the potential to spread information - that people will spread it, and that they will 
be party to potential destabilization tactics, either unknowingly or unwillingly, or 
in fact, as sympathisers to the political agenda that the spread of such information 
could promote.
3. Development
3.1. Targeting civilians, reducing trust and increasing 
destabilisation
A primary concern resulting from waning trust in governance institutions is the 
potential for increased societal instability. Potential future crises in Europe will be 
dominated by a complex, hybrid form of challenges or threats that affect or tar-
get populations, in turn creating instability (Major and Mölling 2015, O’Loughlin 
2015, Giegerich 2016, Lanoszka 2016). Citizen trust, loyalties, values, and politics 
are central to understanding these challenges to stability.  Sustainable and legit-
imate governance relies upon trust between government institutions and their 
citizens, and sustainable government is weakened if trust is weak. Destabilisation 
- of states, governance structures, and societal relations - provides a crucial lens 
through which the impacts of trust can be analysed and measured, and helps us 
reappraise definitions and approaches to trust, including which levels are condu-
cive to stable, sustainable and fair social relations and thriving citizens. It is also 
a lens through which we can analyse the ways in which waning trust influences 
governance. 
Political stability pertains to the maintenance of expectations around the flow 
of political exchanges (Ake, 1975). Exchanges are political insofar as they affect, 
or try to affect, “the distribution of power to make decisions for that society” 
(ibid: 271). Laws and political roles contribute to the political structure in which 
such exchanges take place. Instability takes place when the political structure 
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is challenged, either by contesting roles or defying the law (for example). These 
challenge the authority of the political structure. As such, the degree to which a 
political structure can withstand such challenges, the more resilient the structure 
is. Destabilising actions can arise in the face of existing vulnerabilities – erupting 
from economic difficulties such as job losses, the spread of misleading and/or 
false information, fears of migration, increasing threats and consequences due to 
climate change, and so forth. Destabilisation has been directly linked to decreased 
trust in government institutions (European Commission 2018). Destabilisation is a 
result of purposeful action on the part of those who wish to affect the distribution 
of power in a society – the question is often whether these actions are internally 
driven or external. Often, it is a combination of both, whereby internally driven 
vulnerabilities become manipulated by external actors. 
Destabilisation can occur due to a combination of forces to attempt to change 
the efficacy/power of the political structures/system in a society and state. The 
system itself may already create vulnerabilities if it is considered illegitimate by 
the people it is intended to rule – bottom up actions by some citizens to disturb 
and disrupt the political structure if it is seen as not representative of certain 
ideologies or politics may occur – including protests (that can turn violent – ie: 
yellow vests), media campaigns (influence information), the use of violence (ter-
rorism), etc. Today there is an increasing awareness that the vulnerabilities of 
certain political systems, whereby legitimacy is already contested on one or more 
fronts, are further being manipulated by outside sources (state and non-state) to 
create even more instability. The concept of stability has experienced an awkward 
relationship with democracy. Moves towards more stability – through top-down 
governance measures – may hinder democracy rather than promote or support it. 
Democracies are considered to be significantly vulnerable to both internal as well 
as external disruptions and as they are particularly prone to vulnerabilities of le-
gitimacy (Ülgen 2016). As comparatively less rigid and dominant as authoritarian 
systems that engage the use of force more readily to quell uprisings or discontent, 
democracies are more easily vulnerable to unrest, both that which arises from 
within, but also that which is manipulated from external forces. At the same time, 
it has been argued that democracies are better placed “to signal intentions and 
credibly to commit to courses of action in foreign policy than non-democracies” 
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due to the role of “audience costs” and the ability of citizens to articulate their 
support or rejection of governance institutions (Fearon 1994: 578). 
The resilience of a society is heavily dependent upon the trust in which its 
citizens endow upon its institutions and governance approaches. The concept of 
resilience has been recently adopted by the EU as well as NATO as a response to 
destabilisation. In the EU context, resilience has been frequently associated with 
foreign and humanitarian aid initiatives. Resilience can be defined as “the ability 
of an individual, a household, a community, a country or region to withstand, 
cope, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as violence, con-
flict, drought and other natural disasters without compromising long-term devel-
opment” (EuropeAid 2016). The concept has increased its relevance to internal 
and “near neighbour” contexts whereby resilience becomes “the ability to absorb, 
adapt and recover from shocks through a number of initiatives within the EU it-
self, as well as through resilience-building measures in regions adjacent to the EU 
– namely through democracy, human rights, and the rule of law” (Sørensen and 
Nyemann, 2018: 2).  
In policy and scholarly literature, the focus on destabilisation have been large-
ly on institutional responses, whereby EU and partners (eg: NATO) work towards 
strengthening responsiveness and preparedness of institutions and infrastructure 
so that they are less vulnerable to disruption and instability. Whether destabilis-
ing actions are internally or externally generated, the response largely relies on 
a central “solution”, that is, resilience of societies and their institutions and in-
frastructures. The focus has been very top-down, where institutions are strength-
ened, and these strengths are passed along to citizens in the form of advice and 
guidance when confronted with crisis and instability. Far less however has been 
done to examine the role of civil society and citizens themselves, and how they 
can impact the potential “resilience” of institutions and infrastructures. Citizen 
action, inaction, or resistance for that matter, needs to be assessed as well, as they 
are a part of the social network that is expected to handle and overcome crisis and 
instability. In this respect therefore, trust is a crucial element in the role of citizen 
and/or civil society resilience. 
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A significant gap exists between institutional preparation and governance, and 
awareness of citizen agency, as resilience has focused on a top-down, institutional ap-
proach, strengthening primarily institutional structures against instability (EU, NATO, 
individual states). They fail to integrate insights into “security as resilience” under-
stood as a bottom-up, citizen-oriented perspective (human security) through citizen 
agency (Chandler 2012). As well, citizen agency as resilience and trust is inadequately 
understood (Clark-Kazak 2014, Cavelty, Kaufmann et al. 2015, Jose and Medie 2015). 
Local behavioural patterns in this context are often subtle and relatively passive, and 
thus risk being overlooked by institutional approaches (Mac Ginty 2010: 403). Resil-
ience practices of citizens may also be contradictory and inconsistent with institution-
al resilience strategies and expectations of trust (Cavelty, Kaufmann et al. 2015). 
3.2. Looking at gender and intersecting identities: how are they 
relevant for thinking about hybrid threats?
As they combine the simultaneous employment of military and non-military 
tools, primarily targeting societies at large, hybrid threats cannot be countered 
solely by military means. In fact, below threshold (non-state violence), grey zone 
threats require an equally, if not more substantial and inclusive response from the 
civilian domain, and a strengthening of social trust and resilience among citizens. 
Gender and other identity marker divisions and hierarchies are a feature of all 
societies, so to provide an inclusive response we need to think about gender and 
the intersectional ways in which women and men coming from dominant or mar-
ginalized communities might be targets for or actors in hybrid threats. 
Gender is one of the most central identity markers, and lenses, for understand-
ing the civilian environment. So, any analysis of civilian environment and the way 
it is targeted or the way that resilience can be built needs to include at a minimum 
a gender analysis. To go further, and as we have already discussed, civilians as a 
group are divided not only by differences of gender, but also of race, nationality, 
ethnicity, religion, class, and sexual orientation. All of these differences both in 
self-identification and imposed categorisation have an impact on the position and 
power of individuals and the ways in which they may be actors both in creating 
hybrid threats, and in reacting to them and resisting them. 
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However, whilst civilians consists of and includes all genders, gendered constructions 
of civilian society have traditionally reduced civilians to be gendered as “female”. The 
gendered approach to civilians during warfare, where women are seen as “innocent”, 
“inactive” and “to be protected” has been projected onto the notion of “civilian” as a 
whole so that a gendered opposition is built between (simplistically) men and women. 
Within this dichotomy, men are actors of warfare who should protect the “vulnerable” 
women and children in the civilian population. Whilst hybrid threats are different from 
“classic” warfare, and threaten civilian populations in numerous and diffuse ways, this 
gendered dichotomy persists. This problematizes the extent to which we can examine 
“civilians” as actors in crisis and war and points to the need to deconstruct dominant 
understandings and representations of “civilians”, and to analyse more closely the 
hierarchies and differences within civilian populations.
This is relevant when looking at men and women as actors of hybrid warfare. 
How do these men and women engage in hybrid warfare and pose hybrid threats? 
One of the tools of hybrid threat is that of dis-/mis-information, often spread 
through social media. Gender is important in understanding both the originators 
and the receivers of disinformation. It is well known that social media feeds and 
internet search results are constructed to show users results that cohere with 
what they already believe (for example by creating user profiles based on what a 
person has “liked” on their Facebook account). The resulting “filter bubbles” or 
“echo chambers” mean that users receive information and news consistent with 
their existing beliefs and preferences, and fake news can thus match these beliefs 
and preferences. Further, these algorithms are exploited by companies such as 
Cambridge Analytica which create profiles based on people’s gender, sexual orien-
tation, personality traits among others. Women and men can thus be targeted with 
different fake news stories which are more likely to resonate with their gender 
identity. These processes will additionally target other identity markers when and 
where relevant, often simultaneously.  
3.3. Exploiting Gendered Social Cleavages 
Recent and highly polarized debates over social issues such as violence against 
women, immigration and integration of migrant communities, the place of re-
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ligion or secularism in European societies have provided fertile ground for the 
deployment of hybrid forms of threat which have sought to exacerbate and widen 
divisions based around these issues in society, and thus exploit vulnerabilities. 
As we noted earlier, disinformation does not always have to be hidden or always 
impossible to attribute. In fact, well-known websites or media sources can easily 
play a role in spreading disinformation, or at least, information that promotes po-
larized points of view and discord (towards destabilization) in a society (La Cour, 
2020). Some Russian and pro-Russian social media sites and information sources 
have portrayed Western Europe and “European values” as a threat to their own 
“traditional” gender norms and regimes, through, for example the promotion of 
homosexuality and the breakup of the “traditional” family. As such in Ukraine, 
Russian soft power initiatives appealed to conservative values and opinions re-
garding family life and sexuality to try and convince Ukrainians of the dangers 
of Europe and its promotion of “sexual deviance” and the abolition of traditional 
gender norms and roles: “Not by chance, Russian media tried to compromise the 
recent mass protests in Ukraine, which started under pro-European slogans, by 
reducing European values to the issue of sexual minorities. In Russian social me-
dia Ukraine’s pro-European choice has been often discussed in sexual terms, as a 
sexual deviation and an abandonment of gender norms’ (Zhurzhenko, 2014: 259). 
Within the EU, pro-Russian and anti-immigration social media sites have exploit-
ed long-standing disputes such as that over Muslim wearing the hijab in public spac-
es. The banning of hijab in public space or public employment in several European 
states has already led to public division, and this issue is thus one which has lent it-
self to manipulation. In highly gendered messages, Muslim women who wear a hijab 
are often depicted as oppressed or backward – victims of patriarchal cultures -, and 
at the same time as pawns used to encourage the Islamization of European society. 
In France, for example, where this debate has been ongoing for decades, following 
the passing of legislation to ban the wearing of hijab in public schools in 2004, the 
theme is one which is recurrent in far-right and anti-immigrant messaging. Recently 
this issue has recurred frequently in public debate and has been exploited by far-
right and anti-immigrant movements through various social media channels (Bila 
2019; Froio 2019; Schmelk 2017). In 2016 a significant online polemic was created 
following the decision of the mayor of Cannes to ban women from wearing a “burki-
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ni” on the city’s beaches, that was quickly overturned by the French Conseil d’Etat. 
However, this small legal quarrel was turned into a large-scale public debate through 
the online activity of a few far-right websites and social media accounts. In 2019 
when the French sportswear store, Decathlon, decided to start selling hijabs adapted 
for running, another huge social media storm broke out accusing the store of want-
ing to “Islamize” France (Kaminski 2019). 
The issue of the hijab is one which provides easy fuel for the far-right to provoke 
huge public reactions and stoke divisions. As well as protesting against the “Islam-
ization” of France, they use arguments related to the defence of women’s rights to 
protest against the hijab, and thus aim to enrol sectors of the public that would not 
necessarily be favourable to more classic far-right arguments. The normalisation of 
white supremacist theories and opinions in many countries, for example, can be 
explained by the ways in which some people are attracted to ideas which attribute 
superiority to their racial, gendered or ethnic category over “others”.   
The use of these types of arguments to create social divisions has been magni-
fied with the so-called “refugee crisis” in Europe since 2015. The arrival of relative-
ly large numbers of refugees, many from Muslim majority countries such as Syria, 
has proved to be a contentious issue for many European countries, and the use of 
the language of “crisis” by politicians and the media has contributed to making 
this an issue which can be used by actors wishing to create or exacerbate social di-
visions within EU societies. The securitization of migration has been built around 
representations of migrants as a threat to Europe, and in particular as responsible 
for violence and crime, and the issue of migration has been seized as an opportu-
nity for those wishing to disrupt European unity and undermine European citizen’s 
confidence in political leaders and institutions (Juhasz and Szicherle, 2017). These 
threats have often focused on gendered issues, but also simultaneously race and 
ethnicity, and have employed particular representations and stereotypes of men 
and women to gain momentum. The threat of “Muslim” or “migrant” men to “Eu-
ropean” women has, for example, become a key theme in this type of influencing. 
Migrant men are frequently depicted as predatory and sexually aggressive, posing 
a particular threat to European women. It is argued that the countries and cultures 
from which they come do not respect women’s rights, and have very low levels 
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of gender equality, and thus the men from these countries do not understand 
“European values” of gender equality or respect for women’s rights. Thus, for ex-
ample, Sweden has been labelled the “rape capital” of Europe by websites which 
link the high per capita number of refugees in the country to an alleged high 
risk of rape for Swedish women (BBC 2017). A series of websites linked to Russia 
and Hungary have published stories citing statistics from the Swedish National 
Crime Prevention Council to support their claims of massive increases in rape and 
sexual assault which these sites link to the large number of refugees in Sweden. 
However, the statistics are used out of context, failing to note the ways in which 
legal amendments in the definition of sexual assault and changes in methods for 
recording these in public data are in fact responsible for the changing figures on 
these crimes (Juhasz and Szicherle, 2017).
The widespread reporting of the sexual assaults supposedly carried out by “mi-
grant” men in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015 is a well-known example of the way 
in which this threat by male migrants to European women has been perpetuated. 
When some women reported that they had been sexually assaulted during the New 
Year’s Eve celebrations in the city, there were quickly widespread media and social 
media reports claiming that these attacks had been coordinated by migrant and 
refugee men, although there was no accurate proof or reporting of this. The Cologne 
case sparked further reports of other similar attacks. Bild newspaper was forced to 
apologise in February 2017 after it published a report that a “mob” of migrant men 
had assaulted women in Frankfurt (Eddy 2017). In a report published on 6 February 
2017, Bild, “quoted Jan Mai, the owner of a cafe in Frankfurt, as saying that 50 
“Arab-looking men” had assaulted women on 31 December 2016. It also quoted a 
woman it identified only as Irina A., 27, who said she had been among those who 
were groped “everywhere” by the men” (ibid). However, the police affirmed that 
there was no evidence that this crime had taken place, and the newspaper was 
forced to apologise for publishing a false story. In 2016, the “Lisa” case swept to the 
forefront of German news.  Russian TV and media reported widely on the case of a 
thirteen-year-old Russian-German girl who had gone missing in Germany, and who 
had supposedly been kidnapped, beaten and raped by three migrants of Arab origin 
(McGuinness 2016). The information was quickly spread through social media and 
the internet and led to the organisation of demonstrations by extreme-Right groups 
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in Germany (Sablina 2019). The claims that Lisa had been kidnapped were quickly 
shown to be false – she had been staying with a friend – but the rumours and false 
information persisted. The German police, Lisa and her family themselves publicly 
denied the story, but the Russian backed media that had featured the report did 
not issue an apology. They continued to frame the story as showing that Germany 
had a problem with policing and controlling migrants who were carrying out acts of 
sexual violence against women and girls (Baade, 2018). Even in 2018, Russian media 
sources continued to propagate the idea that the “Lisa case” was not fake because 
German courts have not imposed any punishment on Russian media sources for dif-
fusing false information (Jakub, 2016).
The use of gendered representations of migrant threats to create social divisions, 
also has implications for the ways that white men are represented as being under 
threat from feminists, migrants, and all those who are supporting gender equality or 
migrant rights. The use of traditional gender roles is a major factor in the way that 
men and women belonging to alt-right movements choose to portray themselves on 
social media and to try and exert influence on others. The alt-right has been de-
scribed as containing unifying themes which prioritise a fear of difference, whether 
that difference be sexual, gendered, religious, or racial. A cult of masculinity man-
ifests itself in an “obsession with sexual politics and the heteronormative gender 
roles embodied in the nuclear family” (Marwick and Lewis, 2017: 12). 
Membership of alt-right groups is predominantly male. Bergman (2018) con-
ducted an comprehensive analysis of rank-and-file supporters of the Alt-Right and 
argues that the movement promotes a sense of “male entitlement” which, in turn, 
is “easily radicalized and connected to white nationalism and white supremacy” 
(Bergman, 2018 in Fielitz and Thurston 2019: 34). By attacking feminism and lib-
eral notions of gender equality, the Alt-Right has “created a culture of vitriolic de-
fensiveness among young white males, which aims to establish a common belief in 
white male victimhood” (ibid). The Alt-Right’s existence, in part, relies upon a re-
jection of the accomplishments of feminism (ibid; May and Feldman, 2019). These 
messages are spread through social media sites and target white men in order to 
radicalise them and create resistance to government and existing social structures, 
ultimately resulting in acts of violence and conflict within societies: “Far-right 
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movements exploit young men’s rebellion and dislike of , ‘political correctness’, to 
spread white supremacist thought, Islamophobia, and misogyny through irony and 
knowledge of internet culture. This is a form of radicalization happening primarily 
through forums, message boards, and social media targeting young men immersed 
in internet culture” (Marwick and Lewis, 2017: 29).
Images of women (perceived as conventionally attractive/beautiful) have been 
stolen and used on fake social media accounts to target and attract men to these 
accounts. In particular, images of “attractive” white women have been stolen and 
employed by Russian backed social media bots to attract white heterosexual men. 
For example, a former beauty queen, Rachel Hunter, was targeted in this way, when 
her image was stolen and used to front an alt-right facebook account in order to 
attract men to the movement. One study on the activity of troll social networks 
linked to the war in Syria,  revealed that when experts published reports or articles 
that were critical of Russia or of the Bashar El Assad regime, they were instantly 
trolled by hundreds of fake accounts,”presenting themselves as attractive young 
women eager to talk politics with Americans, including some working in the na-
tional security sector” (Weisburd, Watts and Berger, 2016). These accounts which 
present themselves as belonging to attractive women are termed “honeypot” ac-
counts, aimed to lure men into following and engaging with them. 
There are some women in the Alt-right movements and they also reject “fem-
inism” and adhere to ideas promoting women’s “complementary” role to that of 
men, as housewives and mothers, reproducing “white” families (Mattheis, 2018). 
Images and representations of “traditional” male roles and hypermasculinity have 
also been used in Russia’s information warfare campaign in Ukraine. Research has 
shown the way in which hypermasculine images of Putin have been used to em-
phasize the strength of Russia, whilst Ukrainian leaders and their Western Europe-
an supporters were targeted as feminised or homosexual to show their weakness 
and supposed decadence (Romanets, 2017). One report on a Russian “troll factory” 
pushing out social media posts to undermine Russian opponents described a bank 
of humiliating images of Western leaders, including one of the then Ukrainian 
president Poroshenko in drag declaring “We are preparing for European integra-
tion” (Walker, 2015).
ICONO14 |  January - June 2021 Volume 19 Nº 1 | ISSN: 1697-8293 | DOI: ri14.v19i1.1618
61 | Jane Freedman, Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv & Velomahanina Razakamaharavo
MONOGRAPH
4. Conclusion
Looking at the ways in which men and women may engage in hybrid warfare 
differently, and may be targeted in varying ways, also allows us to think about dif-
ferent levels and strategies of resilience and resistance which might be employed 
by men and women, amongst different dominant or marginalized identity groups. 
Researchers have previously made the argument that more gender equal societies 
may be more peaceful and less likely to engage in war. We could also suppose that 
societies which were more gender equal might be more resilient to the type of hy-
brid warfare which involves weaponizing social divisions such as those discussed 
above to create civil conflict. If, as we have argued above, hybrid threats such as 
fake news or disinformation, and misinformation, seek to use existing inequalities 
and faultlines in societies and to weaponize these to create increasing social con-
flict, it stands to reason that societies which are more equal, have fewer disparities 
based on gender, race, class, ethnicity, nationality etc, and have more solidarity 
between citizens, are harder to destabilise in this way, and thus more resilient. 
Udupa and Pohjonen (2019) propose an “extreme speech” framework which em-
phasizes ethnographic sensibilities of certain cultural contexts which make them 
more receptive to certain types of hate speech and disinformation. This framework 
focuses on systematic enquiries into histories of racial construction and hierar-
chies which can be weaponized to provoke social conflict. We suggest that the 
addition of a focus on constructions of gender norms and hierarchies could be add-
ed to provide an intersectional framework to understand the ways in which social 
resilience to disinformation can be reinforced. 
Using intersectional approaches to analysis allow us to understand broader, 
complex regions that are increasingly targeted by hybrid threats. But more needs 
doing. Some research is being accumulated with regard to democracies in the 
global north but less is being done with a view to the global south, where more 
newly emerging democracies can be extremely vulnerable to possible influence 
operations, misinformation and disinformation. There is a gap in literature explor-
ing various angles of hybrid threats and warfare in the global south, especially in 
Africa. The existing literature on African cases explores very little to what extent 
technologies affect institutions, crises management or norms (and vice-versa). 
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Most of the scholarship revolves around social media and elections (Ndlela & Mano, 
2020), digital dictatorship and democracy (Gopaldas, 2019), separatism, hate 
speech (Ibrahim et al, 2019) and its social impacts (Aganze & Kuslinga, 2020). 
Despite this lack of theorization, some studies are starting to emerge such as the 
attempt to understand for example motivations for sharing mis-/disinformation by 
comparing African countries (Wasserman et al, 2019). Such research is imperative 
both to understand impacts of hybrid attacks on emerging democracies, but also 
for comparative benefits. Democracies in the global south may be “emerging”, but 
so is power from this region, with an increasingly well-connected and technology 
savvy, young population. In the case of the global south, for example, there is no 
research exploring the implications of postcolonialism (including gendered norms) 
in hybrid warfare/ threats. As such, gender and intersectional analyses of hybrid 
threat scenarios open up the doors to a better understanding about how hybrid 
threats function, across contexts, making use of identity markers from gender to 
race and ethnicity, from age to class or sexual orientation. The literature (on secu-
rity, disinformation, hybrid warfare etc.) has not yet addressed the implications of 
the management of those crises and the dynamics of trust, security and resilience 
at play. The roles structures of domination, oppression, inequality etc. play in 
hybrid threat processes can no longer be ignored.
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